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Intemational  trade  economists  have  typically  argued  that an opentrade  regime is very important  for
economic  development.  This  view has been  based  partly  on neoclassical  trade theory,  which generally  finds
that a country  improves its welfare from trade liberalization,  partly on casual empirical  observation  that
countries  which remain  highly  protected  for long periods of time appear  to suffer significantly  and perhaps
cumulatively,  and partly  on systematic  empirical  work  that also finds  trade liberalization  beneficial  to welfan
and growth (e.g., Sachs and Warner, 1995).')  What has been troubling is that the numerical  modeling
estimates  of the impact of trade liberalization  have generally  found  that trade liberalization  increases  the
welfare  of a country  by only about one-half  to one percent of GDP,  gains which are very small in relation
to the paradigm. 2'  For  many  years authors  have  claimed  that  the welfare  gains  from  trade liberalization  wou!d
be much  larger  if the dynamic  impact  of trade  liberalizationwere  taken into  account, but heretofore  no such
models  have  been developed. 3)
')Of  course,  all  aspects  of  the  paradigm  that  trade  liberalization  leads  to faster  growth  have  been  subject  to criticism.
For example,  Rodrik  (1992) has developed  models  in which  trade liberalization  is immiserizing,  and causality  has
been  questioned  in the  Sachs  and  Warner  results.
')See,  for example,  de Melo  and Tarr  (1990;  1992;  1993);  Harrison,  Rutherford  and Tarr  (1993;  1997a;  1997b);  Morkre
and Tarr  (1980;  1995);  and Tarr  and Morkre  (1984). The  consistently  small  estimated  gains in  constant  returns  to scale
models  came  to be known as "the  Harberger  constant."  While some  estimates  with increasing  returns  to scale  models
(such  as Harris,  1984)  have  been  larger  (up  to 10  percent  of GDP),  these  estimates  have been  more controversial,  often
based on regime  switching  (see Harrison,  Jones et al., 1993;  and Harrison,  Rutherford  and Tarr, 1997a).  In our view,
the results  are less  than convincing  for a strong  version of the paradigm.
3 'Moreover, we have shown,  see  Rutherford  and Tarr (1997),  that  a comparative  static model  may be a close
approximation  to the annual  welfare  gains  from  trade  liberalization  in a dynamic  model,  if the  dynamic  model  is
simply  Ramsey  based, i.e., if there is no endogenous  growth.
Some  numerical  general equilibrium  modelers  have produced  comparative  "steady  state"  estimates  of the welfare
gains  which  are two  to four times the comparative  static  estimates  of their models  (e.g., Harrison,  Rutherford  and
Tarr, 1996, 1997;  Francois,  McDonald  and Nordstom,  1996;  and Baldwin,  Francois  and Portes, 1997).  These  are
multi-sector  quantifications  of the Baldwin  (1989) 'medium term  growth  bonus,"  which  hold  the rental rate  on
capital  constant  and allow the capital  stock  to vary. Harrison,  Rutherford  and Tarr (1996; 1997a)  and Rodrik  (1997)
have  explained,  however,  that these  estimates  overestimate  the gains from  trade liberalization  in a Ramsey  type
model  because  they fail to adjust  for the foregone  consumption  cost  of achieving  the higher  capital stock.
-1-With  the development  of endogenous  growth  theory  (for  example,  Romer  (1990),  Romerand  Rivera-
Batiz (1991), Grossman  and Helpman (1991) and Segerstrom,  Anant and Dinopoulos  (1990)) a clear
theoretical  link  has been provided  from trade liberalization  to economic  growth.  Due to the complexity  of
the models,  however,  the theoretical  literature  has necessarily  focused  on a comparison  of the steady-state
growth  paths,  and been  based on rather  aggregated  models.  Since  two policies  that achieve  the same steady-
state growth path could have very different  welfare consequences,  it is important  to develop  models  that
derive  the dynamic  adjustment  path and evaluate  the welfare  effect.
In this paper  we develop  a dynamic  small  open economy  model  defined  over  a 54 year  horizon,  frnm
1997  to 2050  with terminal  constraints  which approximate  an infinite  horizon.  There are two sectors  Xand
Y. The Y  sector  produces goods  for domestic  and export markets  under constant  returns to scale (CRTS).
Inputs  into  Yare labor  and a pure intermediate  goodX.  The  good  Xis produced  by both foreign  and domestic
firms under  the large group  monopolistic  competition  assumption  and increasing  returns  to scale  (IRTS). 4)
We employ  the by now standard  assumption  that inputs  ofXaffect the production  of Yaccording  to
a Dixit-Stiglitz  function.  This means  that additional  varieties  of  X reduce  the cost of producing  Y. Firms in
the IRTS  sector  must incur  a once  and for all fixed  cost of a "blueprint"  in order to introduce  a new product;
and firms also incur  a fixed cost in any period in which they operate. Domestic  firms use relatively  more
local  inputs  and relatively  less imported  inputs. Product  development  costs  are lower  for foreign  firms  under
the assumption  that in relation  to the size of the domestic  market there is an infinite stock of varieties  of
Nonetheless,  the  estimates  for  Hicksian  equivalent  variation  remain  less  than  five  percent  of GDP, except  for  the
Baldwin,  Francois  and Portes  paper;  and  Rodrik  (1997)  has  estimated  that  after  adjusting  for  the  foregone
consumption  cost  of investment,  the  estimated  equivalent  variation  in the  Baldwin,  Francois  and  Porter  paper  would
also  be less  than  five  percent.
')Our  analysis  can  be viewed  as  an extension  of Ethier  (1982)  and  Markusen  (1989,  1991).  Markusen  investigated
the  implications  of the  substantial  trade  in imported  intermediate  inputs  using  static  and  two  period  models.  A
previous  model  of ours,  Rutherford  and  Tarr  (1996),  also  employed  an Ethier-Dixit-Stiglitz  framework  to evaluate
the  impact  of trade  liberalization.  In that  paper,  however,  the  growth  rate  was  not  affected  endogenously,  so  the
additional  welfare  gains  from  the  variety  effect  were  derived  from  transitional  dynamics.
-2-products on international  markets;  thus, their development  costs represent  solely  the cost  of adapting  and
introducing a Product  from the international  market to the domestic  economy. All agents in the model,
including firms in the IRTS sector, optimize  over the infinite  horizon  with perfect foresight  apart from
unanticipated policy changes.
In our central  model,  the country  cannot borrow  on international  capital  markets, so  that the value
of imports  must be covered  by exports in each period  of the model.  We investigate  the impact  of allowing
capital flows in the sensitivity  analysis.
The onl-v  tax distortion in the economy  in the benchmark  data set is a twenty percent  tariff on
imports. We first construct  a steady  state growthpath  with which  we can compare  results of counterfactual
experiments.  We then reduce the tariff  to ten percent and compare all variables to their values in the
benchmark steady-state.
We construct  a series  of counterfactual  scenarios  to determine  the sensitivityof  the results to tax, macro  and
financial  policies, as well as to different  tariff cuts and parameter  specification.  We evaluate  the welfare
consequences  of a change  in policies,  i.e.,  we report  the Hicksian  equivalent  variationfor  the infinitely-lived
representative  agent.
Some of our mnost  important results are as follows: with lump sum revenue  replacement,
reducing a tariff from 20% to  10% produces a welfare increase (in terms of Hicksian equivalent
variation over the infinite horizon) of 10.7 percent of the present value of consumption in our central
model. We investigated the sensitivity of our results to all of the key parameters in the model and
found that the welfare estimates for the same tariff  cuts ranged  up to 37 percent  with capital  flows,
and down to 4.7 percent with inefficient replacement taxes. Doubling or quadrupling  the size of the
tariff  cuts, which would characterized the experience of many developing countries in the past 30
years, resulted in estimates of the welfare gains that were at least twice or four times, respectively,
-3-the size of the cut. We applied  the model  to five  developing  countries  and estimated  the impact  of the tarif
changes  which  they  plan to undertake  as part  of their Uruguay  Round  commitments.  Our  estimatedgains  are
large in relation  to the literature  estimates  of the impact  of the Uruguay  Round.
Our  results illustrate  the crucial  importance  of complementary  reforms  to fully realize  the potential
gains  from the trade reform.  Notably,  with the ability  to access  international  capital markets, the gains are
more  than  doubled.  Moreover,  use of inefficient  replacement  taxes  will significantlyreduce  the gains. These
combined results show that complementary  macroeconomic,  regulatory,  and financial  market reforms to
allow  capital  flows  and efficient  alternate  tax collection  are crucial  to realize  the pDtentially  large gains from
trade liberalization.
Large welfare gains in the model arise because  the economy  benefits  from increased  varieties  of
foreign  X in the short run, and increased  varieties  of domesticX  after several  years. In order to assess  the
importance  of variety  gains,  we perform  the tariff reform in a constant  returns  to scale, perfect competition
Ramsey  model;  then additional  varieties  do not increase  total  factorproductivity.  In this model  the Harberger
constant  reemerges,  as welfare  gains are about  0.5 percent  of the present  value of consumption.
We apply  our model  to datasets  for five  countries:  Argentina,  Brazil,  Korea,  Malaysiaand  Thailand,
and assess  the effects  on these economies  of the tariff changes  they agreed  as part of their Uruguay  Round
commitments.  The relatively large welfare gains that we estimate for these five countries  relative to the
literature  estimates  ofthe gains from the Uruguay  Round  for these countries,  suggest  that the large  welfare
gains in our stylized model  are not based on implausible parameter  values.
Although  estimates  of equivalent  variation  have  been widely  seen as too small, some may question
whether our  estimates are too large.  To put these numbers in perspective,  in appendix A we have
analytically  derived the relationship  between a permanent  increase in the steady state growth rate and
equivalent variation. A welfare gain of between 10 and 35 percent of consumption  corresponds  to a
permanent  increase  in the growth  rate of between 0.4 and I percent.  A  policy induced  change  in the growth
-4-rate of this magnitude is quite plausible in the context of the actual long term per capita growth rates overthe
25-30 year period  beginning in 1962. The highest average long term  annual growth rates are for the four
"East Asian tigers," with rates over 6 percent (Korea at 6.7 percent is the highest). At the other extreme theie
are  17 countries, largely in Africa, with negative growth rates, three of which are less than negative 2
percent. The average per capita growth rate for developing (developed) countries as a whole is 1.6 (2.9)
percent with a standard deviation of the growth rate of 2 (1).5)
Sachs and Warner (1995) maintain that this large range and standard deviation of the growth rates
across developing countries is explained in large part by trade liberalizatbn. Based on cross-country growth
regressions, they estimate that open economies have grown about 2.45 percent faster than clcsed economies,
with even greater differences for open versus closed economies among developing  countries. They note that
trade liberalization  is often accompanied by macro stabilization and other market reforms, and their open
economy variable can be picking up these other effects as well. 6) But they argue that trade liberalization is
the sine qua non of the overall reform process, because other interventions such as state subsidies often are
unsustainable in an open economy. While, like Sachs and Warner, our results show that trade liberalization
can have an important impact on growth, we also find that the benefits of trade liberalization can be dissipatad
without complementary reforms in the macroeconomic, financial and tax areas.
These econometric estimates suggest that our estimate of equivalent variation, which corresponds
in our central model to a growth rate change of 0.4 percent, may still be too small. But larger tariff changes
5)These  estimates  are taken  from Pritchett  (1997),  who performed  the calculations  based on the Summers  and Heston
(1991)  data.
6 OBecause  trade  policy  may be endogenous,  some  have criticized  the Sachs  and Warner  OLS  estimates  as suffering
from simultaneity  bias. Ann  Harrison  and Dani Rodrik  (1997)  have provided  preliminary  estimates,  however,  that
show  that  the impact  of trade liberalization  on growth  is even larger  when the simultaneity  bias is taken into
account;  in particular,  a ten percent  reduction  in  the tariff as we have  simulated  above,  is estimated  to increase  the
growth  rate by considerably  more than our estimate  of 0.3 percent. In addition,  they show that  the black  market
premium  plays an equally  important  role as tariff  reduction.  Although  Sachs  and Warner  take the black  market
premium  as part of their openness  measure,  Harrison  and Rodrik  separate  it and prefer to think of it as a proxy  for
macro  stabilization.
-5-than  our ten percent  cut produce  larger  welfare gains and correspond  to higher  changes  in the growth  rates.
On the other  hand,  Young  (1995)  has estimated  that the majority  of the growth  amorg  the four East
Asian  tigers  is explained  by factor  accumulation,  not increases  in total factor productivity.  But even  Young
has found  that average  annual  total factor  productivity  growth  was  equal to 1.7  percent in South  Korea, 2.1
percent  for Taiwan  and 2.3 percent  for Hong  Kong.  Only  Singapore  had  virtually  zero growth  in total factor
productivity  according  to Young's  estimates.  Using  Young's  data,) however,  but correcting  for a bias in the
estimation  procedure,  Rodriguez-Clare  (1997)  estimates  that a much  larger  share (almost 60 percent  ) of the
growth  among  these  four countries  is due to an increase  in TFP.  We ccnclude  that a detailed  examination  of
the East Asian tigers leaves a sufficient  role for policy  in explaining  growth  that our equivalent  variation
estimates  are not excessive.
Since  our model employs  the Chamberlinian  large  group assumption,  the markup  over fixed  costs
remains  unchanged,  so there  are no rationalization  gains.  Thus,  these  calculations  show  that the Ethier-Dixit
Stiglitz  characterization  of production,  where additional  varieties  lowers  costs, is sufficient  to generate  the
large  welfare  gains  and increase  in per-capita  income. We have also developed  a model in which  there are
positive spillovers  from additional foreign  varieties on the costs of introducing  new domestic varieties.
Although  the domestic  industry  recovers  more  rapidly,  the welfare  gains are  mt significantly  affected,  since
additional domestic varieties come largely at the expense of foreign varieties. Since the existence  of
spillovers  is somewhat  controversial,  the robustness  of our results  with respect  to spillovers  provicbs  support
for the variety-trade  liberalization  paradigm.
The remainder  of this paper is organized  as follows. Section  2 outlines essential features  of our
model. Section  3 presents  results and sensitivity  analysis  with respect  to model structure. The application
7)For  Singapore,  Rodriguez-Clare  corrected  for inconsistencies  in the  data.
-6-of the model  to the Uruguay  Round commitments  of five developing  countries  is presented  in Section  5.
Section  6 concludes.  Appendix  A provides  further  details on welfare  calculations  over an infinite  horizon,
relating  changes  in the economic  growth  rate to infinite-horizon  welfare and then show how we apply  these
results  to approximate  infinite  horizon  welfare.  Appendix  B describes  the stylized  benchmark  data set and
model  calibration.
2. Model  Formulation
We  consider  a two sector  economy. The  Y sector  produces  exports  and final  goods  for the domestic
market  under constant  returns  to scale (CRTS)  and perfect  competiticn.  The  X sector which is composed  of
both  domestic  and foreign  firms produces  intermediate  goods  under increasing  returns  to scale (IRTS)  and
imperfect  competition  with a Dixit-Stiglitz  representation  of the impact  ofincreases  in the number  of products
on total factor productivity. Markups  on goods in the IRTS sector  are based on the Chamberlinian  large
group  assumption--that  is, the elasticity  of demand  facing  the representative  firm is equal  to the compensatel
elasticity  of substitution  between  varieties. Final  demand  arises  from  an infinitely-lived  epresentative  agent
who is at the margin indifferent between an additional unit of consumption  and an additional unit of
investment.  In this section  we outline  the key features  of the model  in terms  of the objectives  and constraint
facing  various  agents.
2.1 Consumer  Behavior
The intertemporal  utility  function  of the infinitely  lived representative  consumer  is the discounted
sum of the utility  of consumption  over the horizon:
u  = (  E  A'  Cf  P
-7-In this equation  the parameter  p controls  the intertemporal  elasticity  of substitutioti)  and A is the single
period discount factor. Aggregate consumption  in a given period (Q  is a Cobb-Douglas  aggregate  of
consumption  of domestic  and imported  final goods:
C  =CD  D CM  D
t  I  f
We assume that imported  final goods cannot be produced  in the home market, due to technical
limitations  of the domestic final goods sector. The agent's intertemporal  and within-period  consumption
decisions  are  weakly  separable.  Thus,  the typical  static  first order  condition  applies  on consumption  decisions
within  a time period,  given  a decision  on how  much  b spend  on consumption  in any period.  In the standard
manner, the intertemporal  decision is based on the maximization  of the utility function subject to the
constraint  that the present  value of consumption  equals  the present  value of income:
max U = ( E  A  CD,  CM  t"  P)p
s.t.
(1 +  c) (  P  t  CD,t  s j  PM  CM)  =  WI  L  + II
In this expression,  all prices  are defined  in present  value  terms,  discounted  to period  0 (=1997).  The
right side  of the constraint,  which is the present  value  of income,  includes  the present  value  of wage incomeO
together  with profits  from existing  capital stocks  and patents.  T  is the consumption  tax, discussed  below.
In a steady-state  equilibrium,  there are no pure profits,  but along  an adjustment  path  moving  to a new steady
state  there may  be returns  associated  with existing  capital  and markups  over marginal  cost. In other  words,
S) The  intertemporal  elasticity  of substitution  (T  =  1/l-p-  See  table  I for  the  assumed  values  of elasticities  in
different  sectors.
9)  Note  that  population  is fixed  over  the  time horizon.  Economic  growth  results  solely  from  productivity
improvements  due  to the  accumulation  of varieties,  and  the  real  wage  increases  over  time  relative  to the  prices  of
domestic  output  and imports.
-8-pure profits and losses  are only associated  with current  (extant) firms. All firms formedduring  the model
horizon  earn zero economic  profit.
2.2 Government  Revenue  and Expenditure
The government  provides public goods and services at an exogenous level through the infinite
horizon.  While we presume  that these goods are provided  because they generate net benefits for the
representative  consumer,  we do not formally  model  the impactof  public  provision  on consumer  well-being.
Instead,  we account  for the cost of providing  public  sector  services  through  the imposition  of an equal-yield
constraint  asserting  that any change in tariff rates must be compensated  by a permanent  change in one of
three  alternative  domestic  tax instruments. The government  purchases  domestic final output (GD) and
imported  final output  (GM,) to assure  that a given  level of public provision  is maintained,  i.e.
GDD  GM 1  G
I 
The public sector budget  constraint  (which determines  the replacement  tax rate) is then written in present
value  terms as:
(p,D  GD, + p,M  GM,)  =  E  (  T,M(ttM)  + T,C(Tc) + T,K(CK)  +  T7Y(rY)  )
In this equation  the sum on the left represents  the cost of public expenditures,  and the sum on the right
represents tax revenue from tariffs, consumption  taxes, capital income taxes and final output taxes,
respectively. The tariff rates (tQM)  are exogenously  specified  policy variables, whereas the tax rates on
consumption,  capital  income  and output  are determined  endogenously  to assure  that the government  budget
constraint  is satisfied.1 0)
10) In  any  equilibrium  only  one  of the  replacement  tax instruments  is  non-zero,  depending  on  the  scenario-specific
replacement  tax  option.
-9-2.3 Sales and Production  of the Final Good
Good  Y  is produced  as differentiated  products  for sale  in the domestic  and international  markets.  TIB
shares  of sales  at home  and abroad  are  determined  by relative  prices. This iseffectively  an Armington-style
differentiation  of products in the export  market. A constant  elasticity of transformation  (CET) function
relates  the composite  output  level in a given  period  to domestic  andexport  sales.  Firms producing  the final
good  maximize  profit subject  to the constraint:
y  f  (DJ  +  (1-T1D)  (-|  f
_~~~~  E
In this equation  parameters  D and E  are the base year (1997) levels of output  to the domestic  and export
markets,  and lD is the baseline  value share  of domestic  sales in total sales (the base year production  level is
scaled  to unity).
Production  of the Y  composite  is associated  with a nested  production  function based on inputs of
labor (L) and differentiated  intermediate  inputs (xi ).  Given prices of intermediate  goods  and labor,  the
aggregate  production  sector operates  so to minimize  the costs of producing  a given output subject  to the
constraint:
IN  a/p  i  ND  P  NF  a/p L-  i=  -I-  x  PDS  X
In this function,  the intermediate  inputs and labor  enter in a Cobb-Douglas  aggregate  with value
shares  determined  by base year demands.  It is evident  from the production  function  that we have firm level
rather  than national  product  differentiation.  Since  costs  of varieties  can differby  foreign  or domestic  origin,
at the second  level,  within  the intermediate  input  (X) nest,  we account  for substitution  between  domestic  and
foreign  varieties  according  to a constant-elasticity-of-substitution  aggregation. The inputs of intermediates
-10-from domestic  and foreign firms represent  the effective  supply of X from these firm types. The effective
supply  of all typef firms is described  by:
(  \ iipIp  1-p
Xf  --  1  (  X  = (nfxf  )XiP =  nf  Xf  f  E  {D,F}
in which  Xjf =  Xf (by symmetry)  is output  of a representative  typef firm,  Xf  = nff  x,f is the total output  from
typeffirms. Holding  total output  from  type f firms  constant,  effective  supply  from type  f firms increases  wih
,-p  I
nf P  = nf,_  which is the "variety  effect  multiplier."  The multiplier  increases  with 17  and increases  as o
decreases  toward 1  (  a >1). (The second  equation  in this expression  reflects  our assumption  of symmetric
firm structure.) We then may express  the aggregate  production  function  as:
Y  Li-a nL  +  p  P  _p  COP
Following  Romer  and others,  we assume  that  the value share  ofX in aggregate  production  is related
to the elasticity  of substitution  between  varietiesso  that a=p, which implies  that  the elasticity  itself  is definel
by the value share  as a =  I/(1 -a).  Making  this substitution,  we have  the following  expression  for aggregate
output:
Y =  (n  L)I a  *  +  (  L)a  ?
2.4 Market  Clearance  Conditions
Output  ofthe good Ysupplied  to the domestic  market can be consumed  or invested. Investment  in
XD  andXF  sectors  involve  forgone  consumption  of domestic  output. The market clearance  for macro output
sold in the domestic  market is given  by:
-1l-D~ = CD~ +GD  +  p'DBf+  tnt(  +D  X,) D,C,G,  E  t  MDF),  ( ,  ,n,  ( a,
This equation states that domestic output is purchased by households (CD,), government (GD ) and firms.
In turn, each firm type has four sources of demand for domestic output: (i) inputs to blue-print design
(D  Bf),  (ii) inputs to physical capital formation (I,),  (iii) recurring fixed costs (np cD) and (iv) variable
costs of production (n  a D X  ).  Both firm types (domestic and foreign) are treated symmetricaly, although ft p  f
we adopt parameters reflecting a relatively larger share of domestic inputs for the domestic firm. Domestic
firms are assumed to make investmnents  in plant and equipment, whereas foreign firns who generally import
all  the  key  components  invest solely  in distribution  facilities  such as warehouses  and  transportation
equipment.
The corresponding supply-demand balance for imported goods is as follows:
Mt  CM,  +  GM,  +  (f  ft  aft  xft)
Thus, imports enter into final demand by consumers and government and intermediate demand by firms.
Imported inputs (  p  Bf)  are  required to establish either a domestic or foreign firm and are also required
for the fixed costs of operation (n  afM  xf,). ft p
2.5 Capital Stock Evolution
In our model, capital is firm-specific following installatbn, and investment rates may fall to zero as
a consequence of unanticipated changes in policy parameters.  Following a standard Solow growth model,
investment in period t produces a unit of additional capital in the following year which may be used for
production in the future.  Physical capital stock depreciates at a constant geometric rate:
-12-K  =XK  +  f  e  {D,F} ft+1  ft  if,
whereas the number of blueprints (=number of firms) of each type are permanently in the market after they
are produced:
nf  =n  +Bf,  f e {D,F}
2.6 Firms and Production Varieties
In sector Xthere is a one to one correspondence between firms and product varieties. The production
of good X  involves both fixed and variable costs. Variable costs include inputs of aggregate output (domestb
and imported) and capital.  Fixed costs can have two components: (i) "overhead", a recurring fixed capital
cost which is incurred in every period that the firm operates, and (ii) "setup costs", a one time research and
development (or blueprint) cost that must be incurred in order to design and market a new product.  The
relative importance of blueprint and overhead costs are different for domestic and foreign firms.  We asume
that foreign firms sell products which have been designed abroad, so their setup costs represert only the cost
of adapting an existing design to the domestic market.  We model the productbn of blueprints by both types
of firm through the input of domestic and imported aggregates in fixed proportion. We assume in the present
model that there is no international trade in blueprints.  Hence domestic firms may notlicense designs but
must purchase resources to develop new products from scratch.
We assume that most of the costs for foreign firms selling inthe domestic market are associated with
capital services and imported goods.  In this  setting the foreign firm's fixed costs of production may be
interpreted as the cost of maintaining a distribution system within the country.
The model is deterministicand firms have perfect (point) expectations of future prices. Hence, a new
firms will enter at time t if and only if there are positive net quasi-rents. This  happens when the present value
-13-of markup  revenue"')  over marginal  costs into the future  is equal  to or greater than the present  value  of the
fixed  costs  of operation,  including  fixed  operating  costs  (for foreign  and domestic  firms) and the fixed  costs
of product  development  (for domestic  firms). It is possible  to interpret  this decision  using Tobin's  q theory
(see  Baldwin  and Forslid,  1996).  The  rate  of investment  in blueprints  occurs  to the point  that the stock  marke
value of the net income (i.e., the present value of net surplus)  equals the replacement  costs, namely the
marginal  cost of a blueprint, since  R&D is perfectly  competitive.
The  Dixit-Stiglitz  production  function  for good  Xis perfectly  symmetric  with respect  to domestic  ard
foreign  firms, i.e,  we have firm  level  product  differentiation,  with no brand  ornational  preferences.  Varieties
of different vintages are equally preferred but differentiated. In this framework,  all domestic  firms that
operate  sell  the same  quantity  of outputand  their varieties  sell  for the same  markup-inclusive  price. Likewis
all foreign firms which operate sell the same quantity  at the same  price. Domestic  and foreign  firms enter
symmetrically  in the final goods production function so the derived demand for domestic and foreign
intermediates  is symmetric;  but they  remain  differentiated  and  their prices  may  therefore  differ.  Since  foreigi
and domestic  firms are treated  differently  regarding  their cost structures,  their prices usually  differ.
Furthermore,  we assume  that any firm producing  at time t produces  the same  quantity  as all other
firms irrespective  of vintage, but differing  according  to whether  it is foreign  or domestic.  This implies  that
the share of total output produced  by firms of vintage  v is equal  to the share of vintage  v firms in the total
number  of firms. These  life cycle  assumptions  impose  a symmetric  structure  on the equilibrium  which  maka
it possible  to account  for the share of markup  revenue  available in any period  received  by firms of vintage
V.
Unlike  our previous  model  in which  we tracked  the level of investment  for all vintages  through  the
model  horizon,  in the present  model  we achieve  a considerable  simplification  byintroducing  a state variable
This  may  be called  "operating  surplus",  "operating  profit"  or "Ricardian  surplus"  by  different  authors.
-14-for each firm type which tracks the present value of future markup earnings.  This effectively treats the
human capital embodied in blueprint designs in the same analytic framework as is conventionally applied to
physical capital fornation.  The underlying logic in unchanged from the previous model - the free-entry
assumption assures zero profit over the infinite horizon, and the time path of future prices affect not only
investment activity  but the  decisions  by  firms  to  enter  markets  and  undertake  product  development.
Optimization over the infinite horizon applies not only to consumers and competitive firms, but also to the
managers of monopolistically competitive firms.
Our model is one of a small open economy. In particular, we assume that the small open economy
has only a negligible impact on the number  of varieties available on world markets, and the cost of blueprint
for foreign firms. In general, we observe that there are many more varieties of products available on world
markets than are available in the small open economies. Accordingly, we assume that the decision facing
foreign firms is how many of the products for which blueprints akeady exist can be profitably introduced in
the local economy.  The cost of the blueprint is a much smaller component of the cost of production for
foreign firms than for domestic firms -- and a larger fraction of the fixed costs of operation are  associated
with recurring fixed costs of selling in the domestic market.
In the next section we investigate the properties of our model using numerical methods in vhich we
calibrate coefficients of utility and production functions to a reference growth path.  Inthe results that follow,
we have assumed baseline data corresponding to table 1. These input parameters are reconciled to produce
the benchmark  social accounts shown in table 2.  For details on the translation of input data to model
parameters, see Appendix B.
-15-3. Model  Results
We  consider  a 54 year  model  horizon,  defined  over the years 1997-2050.  Initially  there is only one
distortion in the economy:  a twenty percent  tariff on imports  of both goodX,  the pure intermediate  good
produced  under IRTS and monopolistic  competition,  as well as the final good, produced  under CRTS.  In
order to establish  a point  of reference  we calibrate  a model  to a "benchmark"  steady-state  equilibrium.  In our
central  counterfactual  scenarios,  we reduce  the tariff from 20% to 10%  on an ad valorem (net)  basis and
compare  the results  in all scenarios  to the benchmark  steady-state  equilibrium  with the initial tariff in place.
Unless  otherwise  indicated,  all key variables  are reported  as a percentage  of their values  in the benchmark
steady-state  equilibrium.
In table 3 we present  six model  variants  or scenarios.  In our central  model, we assume  there are no
spillovers  from the entry  of foreign  firms and that the lost tariff revenue  is replaced  by a lump sum tax on
consumption.  In our second  model,  we allow  for spillover  effects  of the entry  of foreign  firms which  reduce
the costs  of developing  blueprints  by domestic  firms.  In the third  model,  we assume  all sectors  opeate under
constant  returns  to scale  and perfect  competition;  then  there is no productivity  boost  in the Y sector  as a resut
of additional  varieties  of the X good.
In all of our models  we impose  an "equal  yield constraint"  regarding  government  revenue.  Unless
otherwise  stated,  the reduction  in tariff  revenue  if offset  by a consumption  tax. Given  he absence  of a labor-
leisure  choice,  this is equivalent  to a lump  sum tax. We examine  the impact  of employing  a final output  tax
or a tax on capital  as the replacement  tax in the fourth and fifth models  presented  in table 3.
In our  central  model  and unless  otherwise  stated, we assume  thatthe  country  has difficulty  accessing
international  capital  markets.  This may be because  it has imposed  rstrictions on financial  flows,  or because
macroeconomic  conditions  in the country  are such that it can not attract international  investors.  We takea
polar version of this assumption  and assume that the country faces a balance of trade constraint  in each
-16-period,  i.e., the value of its exports  must equal  the value  of its imports  (both a world prices)  in each period.
We relax this constraint  in the sixth model,  where we allow the home country  to borrow  on international
capital  markets  provided  any borrowing  is repaid  within  the model  horizon.  Then,the  present  value  of exports
must equal  the present  value of imports  over the model  horizon.
In all scenarios we present the Hicksian equivalent variation (EV). The EV is based on the
intertemporal  utility function optimized over the 54 year model horizon,  with an approximation  for the
infinite horizon. We present EV in percentage terms, where the denominator is the present value of
benchmark  consumption  over the infinite horizon.  In the figures,  we present  the 54 year time path  for key
variables  in percentage  change  relative  to the steady-state.  The variables  we report  are as follows:  Figure 1:
Final  Consumption,  composite  of domestic  and imported  final  goods Figure 2: Real Exchange  Rate; Figure
3: Rental  Rate on Capital;  Figure 4 and 5: Number of Domestic  and Foreign  Firms, respectively;  Figure 6:
Consumption  Paths for Alternate  Replacement  Taxes.
3.1 Tariff  Reduction with Central  Assumptions
We  first  consider  the scenario  in which  we cut  all tariffs  from 20%  to 10%.  In this scenario,  Hicksiai
equivalent  variation  (EV) increases  by 10.7  percent of the present  value of consumption  over the infinite
horizon.
What is driving  these results is the following.  The removal  of the tariff on imported  intermediates
results  in an increase  in the tariff ridden  demand  curve  for imports  and  an increase  in the price foreign  firms
receive  for their products.  This increases  the present  value  of  quasi-rents  for foreign  firms. Entry  by foreign
firms occurs  in any period  until  the present  value  of the quasi-rents  are driven  down  to the one time start  up
costs of establishing  a domestic presence for the foreign firm plus present value of the fixed costs of
operating  the domestic subsidiary. After about 1O  years, the number  of foreign  varieties  stabilizes  for the
duration  of the model horizon  at about  30% more  than in the steady  state.  (See figure  5.)  The increase  in
-17-imports,  however,  results in a substitution  effect  that reduces  the demand  for and price  ofdomestic  varieties;
this shuts  down investment  and firm creation  for the domestic  variety for a period  of about 6 years.
Although  the increase in foreign  varieties has the impact  of decreasing  the demand  for domestic
varieties of the intertnediate  good  X, the domestic industry  eventually  stabilizes  after 8 years rather than
progressively  going  into  demise.  (See figure  4.) The  principal  reason  for  this is that the marginal  productivity
of  domestic X in Y  production increases  as use of domestic  X in Y declines. The entire labor force is
employed  in the production  of Y, and it is not possible  to reduce labor  usage applied  to domestic  Xwithout
also reducing  labor usage in imported  X. Thus,  as domestic  X declines  due to substitution  toward cheaper
imported  X, its marginal  product  increases  to eventually  arrest  the further  decline  of the dometic X industry.
The  transitional  dynamics  of the model  in the early  years  are dominated  by theincrease  in the number
of foreign  firms.  The increase  in the number  of firms  has an immediate  impact  on theproductivity  in the final
good  sector  inducing  output  of the final good  sector  to increase in the first year.  This immediate  increase  in
productivity  and output  of the final goods  sector  allows the economy  to satisfy  two constraints  painlessly:
(1) the economy  is able to invest  more  in intermediate  goods(it  takes capital  to produce  the foreign  variety)
without  reducing  consumption  in the short run relative  to the steady  state. Although  the economy  facesa
Ramsey  problem  of determining  the optimal  tradeoff between  consumption  and investment,  the tradeoff  is
within  the framework  of an expanded  choice  set relative  b the steady  state. In fact, the economy consumes
about 7 percent more in the initial years compared  with the benchmark  steady  state (see figure 1); and (2)
despite the period by period balance of trade constraint, the economy is able to import more foreign
intermediate  varieties,  without  reducing  its imports  of final goods.  The economy  meets its balance  of trade
constraint  by exporting  more of the final good.  Thus,  reducing  the tariff does not result in any adjustment
costs  in this model  except  for the losses  that  accrue  to the specific  capital  owners  in the domestic  intermediat
goods sector. The surge in productivity  results in both a 'level" effect and a growth effect regarding  the
increase  in consumption.  The level effect can be observed  by the  jump in consumption  in the first year. In
-18-addition,  however, due to an increase in the rental rate on capital (figure 3), the long run growth rate increases
from 2 to 2.1 percent.' 2 )
3.2 Tariff Reduction with Spillovers
In this scenario, we cut the tariff  on both final and intermediate inports from 20% to 10%, starting
in the initial period. Crucially, we allow an increase in the nunber of foreign firms to decrease the blueprint
costs for domestic firms, with a spillover elasticity equal to four percent.  The equivalent variation of this
scenario is 10.9 percent of the present value of consumption, which differs by only a smal amount from the
10.7 percent for EV in the central model without spillovers.
The decrease in the tariff has the effect of increasing the number of foreign varieties, just  as it does
in the central model. With spillovers, however,  an increase  in the number of foreign  varieties has two
competing effects on investment in the domestic variety of X. On the one hand, as the number of foreign
varieties increases, the demand for the domestic variety decreases, so the quasi-rents available for domestic
firms decreases--decreasing the likelihood of domestic investment. On the other hand, the costs of domestic
blueprints decreases with the number of varieties--increasing the likelihood of investment. Inour formulation
of spillover effects, a  100 percent increase in the number of foreign varieties relative to the steady state,
reduces the blueprint costs of domestic firms by roughly 4  percent relative to the steady state blueprint costs
With these parameters, the spillover effect dominates after about 6 years, after which investnent h domestic
firms resumes. Relative to their steady state value, the number of domestic firms bottoms out at about 90
percent of their steady state value after about 7 years, and climbs to the benchmark steady state value by
'2) In this model  the domestic  and international  rental rates  on capital  are decoupled,  so a tariff reform  produces  a
permanent  increase  in the domestic  interest  rate and a larger  long-run  increase  in the growth rate. The domestic
interest  rate is computed  using  the price of final consumption.  This  rate can temporarily  depart  from  the
international  rental rate on capital in  the model  with perfect  capital  markets  due to Armington  differentiation  of
domestic  and imported  goods. In the long  run, the domestic  interest  rate  and the international  rate converge
aymptotically.
-19-2050.
It may appear puzzling  that with spillovers,  where the domestic industry  has its costs reduced  by
foreign  varieties,  the economy  does  not gain a significantly  larger amount.  The reason is that what is most
important  to the welfare  increase  is the number  of varieties  rather  than tin geographic  source of them. With
spillovers,  once  the profitability  of investment  is restoredfor  the domestic  industry  producing  goodX,  growth
of new foreign  varieties  falls-so  there are more  domestic  firms  and varieties,  but fewer  foreign  varieties.  TIC
loss of productivity  due to the loss of foreign  varieties almost fully offsets  the gain in welfare due to the
increased  number  of domestic  varieties.
3.3 Constant  Returns  to Scale (No  Variety  Multiplier)
In this model,  we replace  increasing  returns  to scale and imperfect  competition  in the intermediate
sector with constant  returns to scale  and perfect competition.  Then only total output  of the intermediate  is
important (numbers of varieties are not counted), so there is no variety productivity  effect.  Although
consumers  and decisions  by investors  optimize  the consumption-capitd  stock choice as in a Ramsey  model,
there is no endogenous  growth.
Equivalent  variation  for this scenario  drops  to 0.5 percent  of the present  value of consumption  over
the infinite  horizon.  Without  the variety multiplier,  there is neither  the initial "level"  effect in consumption
nor  the growth  rate  effect that obtained in our central  and spillover  models.  Transitional  dynamics  are  then
more  painful,  since in order to finance  the additional  investment  in the earlier  period,  consumption  falls in
the early  years relative  to the steady  state. This result is similar to the results  of Rutherford  and Tarr (1997)
who  showed  that a Ramsey  multisector  model with constant  returns to scale is insufficient  to generate  the
large  welfare  gains claimed  for the trade liberalization  paradigm  .
3.4 Impact  of Alternate  Replacement  Taxes
-20-Except for the scenarios  discussed  in this subsection,  we have  employed  a consumption  tax as our
replacement  tax. In the scenarios  described  here,  we use two alternate  taxes as the replacement  tax for the
lost  tariff  revenue:  a tax on  output;  and a tax on capital.  The impact  on the  path of consumption,  as a functicn
of the three replacement  taxes, are presented  in figure 10.
The curve labeled Consumption  Tax is the same curve as in figure 1. Consumption  increases  to
between  7 and 12 percent  of benchmark  consumption  during the model horizon.  The consumption  tax is a
Lump  Sum  distortionless  tax in our model,  but a tax on dormstic  output introduces  certain inefficiencies.  In
particular,  a domestic  output  tax discriminates  against  dometic output in favor of imports,  and against  final
output  in favor of intermediate  production.  As a result  of the relative  inefficiency  ofthe domestic  output  tax,
the path  of consumption  is cut by about  40-50  percent  relative  to the one with a tax on consumption  and the
equivalent  variation  is reduced  to a gain of 6.7 percent of the present  value  of consumption..
Finally,  the tax on capital  produces  a consumption  path  that is inferior  to the one with an cutput  tax,
but preferable  to the benchmark  path  with the tariff  in place, i.e.,  the tax on capital is the most inefficient  of
our three  replacement  taxes,  but is better than a tariff in our model. In our model,  the intermediate  good X
uses capital intensively  since only intermediate  production  uses capital as a primary input and only final
goods use labor as a primary input.' 3)  A tax on capital  then discourages  the introduction  of new varieties
since  it discourages  the investment  required  for the introduction  of new varieties  of products  and discourages
the production  of intermediates  relative  to the production  of final goods.  The  economy  loses  tie productivity
boost from the varieties  and the gain in equivalent  variation  is less than only 4.7 percent of the value of
consumption.  These results illustrate  the importance  of efficient  tax replacement.  With inappropriate
replacement  tax mechanisms,  the gains from trade liberalization  can be drastically  cut.
'3)Each  good  is  used  as an internediate  input in  production  of  the  other  good,  and  thus  both  goods  use  both
primary  factors  of  production  indirectly.
-21-3.5 Capital Flows
In this scenario,  the tariff is reduced  from 20% to 10%,  but the country is assumed  to be able to
borrow  on international  capital  markets  provided  that the borrowing  is repaid  within  the model  horizon.  Tha
the period-by-period  balance  of payments  constraint  is replaced  by the constraint  that the present  value  of
its exports less imports is zero over the model horizon, and all other assumptions in the central model
remained  unchanged.  In this scenario  Hicksian  equivalent  variation  (EV) is 37 percent of the present  value
of benchmark  consumption  over the infinite  horizon. There is an initial  jump in consumption  of about  23
percent, and relative  to the steady  state, the wage rate increases  by about 110 percent  by the year 2050.
Why is the increase in EV with capital flows  more than three times the EV value without  capital
flows?  The  decrease  in the tariff implies  that there is an incentive  for new  foregn firms  to enter, as in the no
capital  flows  model.  The  ability  of the country  to borrow,  however, allows the country  to run trade deficits
and import  much more in the periods immediately  following  tariff reduction.  These  additional  imports  are
used to finance the start up capital of new foreign firms and to pay for the additional  imports  of foreign
varieties.  Foreign  firms increase  by almost 100  percent of their steady  state value with capital  flows  by the
year  2003,  as opposed  to an increase  of about  35 percent  of their steady  state  value  without  capital  flows.  Tie
larger  increase  in foreign  firms leads  to a considerably  larger  increase  in labor  productivity  and the wage  rat
in the early years.
What  is interesting  is that  there is a much  larger  increase  in the number  of domestic  firmswith  capital
flows-in  fact,  the number  of domestic  firms increases  dramatically  relative  to the steady  state value by the
end of the model  horizon.  This is explained  by a real exchange  rate effect. The economy  finds it optimal  to
run  trade deficits  in the early years  of the model.  These  trade deficits  finance  additional  inport varieties  and
additional  consumption  in the early years." 4) The capital  inflows  in the early  years  result  in less real  exchanW.
'4)The  latter  occurs  because  consumers  optimize  consumption  over  the  model  horizon  subject  to their  lifetime
income  constraint  or  permanent  income.  With  the  ability  to borrow  on intemational  capital  markets,  consumers  can
-22-rate depreciation in the early years of the model (in fact, they result in real exchange rate appreciation in the
first two years); but the capital outflows in the later years of the model result in a strong  real exchange rate
depreciation in those years. (See figure 2.)  The steeper real exchange rate depreciation with capital flows
in the years following  2020 (compared  with central assumptions) raises  the costs of importing foreign
varieties in those years, and shifts demand toward domestic varieties. Domestic agents, who fully anticipate
future real exchange rate movements, recognize profit opportunities and begin to invest by the year 2003.
Among  the models we consider, it is perhaps ironic that the model with capital flows, where we see the
largest initial increase of foreign firms, ultimately leads to by far the strongest resurgence of domesic firms,
even compared to the model with spillovers.
3.5 Sensitivity Analysis
In table 4 we present the results of our sensitivity analysis for the key parameters in our model, and
we investigate the impact of different tariff changes. We present the Hicksian equivalent variation for each
scenario (with the approximation for the infinite horizon), and the growth rates calculated over three time
horizons: 1997-2010; 1997-2050;  and 2049-2050, which is the projected growth rate into the infinite horizon
Except for the last three rows, in all scenarios the tariff rate is reduced from 20 to 10 percent.
As a point of reference,  in row 0 we present the,results  obtained with our central assumptions,
previously presented in row 1 of table 3. The result from row I illustrates that the larger the share of imported
in intermediate use (0), the larger the EV gains. The reason is that for a given ten percent cut in the tafiff,  the
same proportional effect on the share of imports, generates more imported varieties, with the consequent
productivity boost, when this share is high. For the share of intermediates in final production (a),  there are
offsetting effects: a higher share of intermediates in final production shotld increase the number of varieties
smooth  consumption  more  easily.
-23-because again the proportional change induced by a ten percent tariff cut should induce a larger increase in
the number of varieties; but the larger is a, the smaller is the variety multiplier for any number of varieties.
Thus, the impact of a change in this parameter on EV is ambiguous, and our two simulations  presented in
rows 2 and 3 along with the central model show that  EV as a function of a is not monotonic in the range of
our central elasticity values.
In the benchmark steady state, the rental rate on capital is 5 percent and thegrowth rate is 2 percent.
It  is shown in appendix A that  as these two  rates approach each other, a given  permanent increase  in
consumption over the infinite horizon yields a larger EV. In rows 4 and 5,  we illustrate the magnitude of the
change by varying each of these rates by one percent from the benchmark.
The results in row 6  indicate that, as is typical in comparative static models, themore elastic are the
substitution possibilities, the greater the gains. In particular, with a larger elasticity of transformation, the
economy is able to export more in response to a real exchange rate depreciation following tariff reduction,
which allows it to pay for more imports; and the additional intermediate imports provide a productivity b@st
through the additional varieties. The impact of this parameter is quite strong, as EV increases from 10.7 to
17.1 percent with a doubling of the elasticity of transformation.
Given that many developing countries in the past 30 years have started from protection levels well
above 20 percent and have implemented trade liberalizations considerably in excess of a ten percent tariff
cut,  in rows 7, 8 and 9 we examine the impact of cutting the tariff from 2O  percent to zero, from 40  percent
to 30 percent and from 40 percent to zero. For the results in rows 8 and 9, we generated a new baseline
steady state growth path with a 40 percent tariff in place. The results of rows 7 and 9 show that the gains are
very substantial for larger tariff cuts-the increase in EV from cutting the tariff from 40 percent to zero is moie
than  50 percent, which is more than double the gain of a cut from 20 percent to 0. Based on measurement
of Harberger triangles, comparative static models also produce the result that the gains increase more than
proportionately with the size of the tariff cut; but the result here is based on the fact that in our simulations
-24-the number of varieties more tlhan  doubles with a doubling of the tariff cut.
5. Application  to the Uruguay  Round  Tariff  Cuts of Five Developing Economies
In order  to assess whether  the large welfare  results obtained  above are dependent on possibly
unrealistic parameter values, we aply  this model to five countries: Argentina, Brazil, Korea, Malaysia and
Thailand. We simulate the impact of the tariff cuts only on the intermediate products that these countries
agreed to as part of their Uruguay Round commitments. That is,we ignore the tariff cuts they made on final
products, as well as any liberalization in services.
For these  countries., we employ the "GTAP" dataset (see Gelhar et al.,  1997) and aggregate the
following GTAP sectors into our single intermediate goods sector: pulp and paper; chemicals, rubber and
plastics,  non-metailic  mineral  products,  primary  ferrous  metals,  non-ferrous  metals,  fabricated  metal
products, transport industries, machinery and equipment, other manufacturing products, and other services
(private).  The resulting parameter values, including the tariff cuts are presented in table 5. Although all
countries have a share of intermediates over 60 percent, the share of imports in intermediates varies from 7
percent in Brazil to 71 percent in Malaysia. Tariff cuts on intermediates varies from 2 percent for Malaysia
to 8 percent for Brazil.
We examine the impact of these Uruguay Round tariff cuts in two models: first in our endogenous
growth model with central assumptions;  and next in a constant returns to scale Ramsey model.  In our central
model,  the Hicksian equivalent variation increase ranges from 1.4 to 7.8 percent of the present value of
consumption over time. The largest value is in Thailand, which is theonly country of the five with a large
share of imported intermediates, and a relatively large  tariff cut of seven percent. Argentina's low share of
imported intermrnediates  and only five percent tariff cut explains its relatively low welfare gain.
These results are not intended to be a precise estimate of the gains from the Uruguay Round for these
economies (see Hlarrison,  Rutherford and Tarr, 1  997a). Rather they suggest that the our large welfare gains
-25-are  not based  on implausible  parameter  values. In the Ramsey  model,  the lack  of variety  induced  productivity
increases  results in quite small welfare increases,  ranging from 0.1 percent in Korea and Malaysia  to 0.4
percent in Thailand.  Again,  this indicates  that estimated  welfare  gains are inthe range of the estimates  from
competitive,  static model.
5. Summary  and Conclusions
This paper has investigated  the effects of tariff liberalization  in a small open economy  in which
endogenous  growth is linked to the introduction  of new products  by domestic or foreign  firms. We have
developed a dynamic numerical  model which allows us to trace out the dynamic adjustment  path of all
variables  and approximate  the infinite-horizon  welfare consequences  of a change in policies. In our central
scenario,  the tariff is cut from 20 percent to 10  percent, and we consider  the impact  both when the country
can access  international  capital markets  and when it cannot.
We found  that the welfare  gain  (Hicksian  equivalentvariation)  from tariff reform  is 10.7  percent of
the present  value of consumption  in our central  model,,  a significant  increase  considering  that the benchmak
tariff rate is only cut from 20 percent to 10 percent. We investigated  the sensitivity  of our results to all of
the key parameters  in the model  and found  that the welfare  estimates  for the same  briff cuts ranged  up to 37
percent with capital flows, and down to 4.7 percent with inefficient  replacement  taxes. Larger  tariff cuts,
which have characterized  the experience of many developing  countries in the past 30 years, resulted in
increases  in the estimates  of the welfare  gains that were at least proportionate  to the size of the cut.
We  applied  the model  to five  developing  countries  and estimated  the impact  of the tariff changes
which  they plan  to undertake  as part of their Uruguay  Round commitments.  The gains of 0.7 percent  to 7.8
percent that we estimate for these countries  are large in relation to the comparative  static or comparative
steady  state estimates  of the effects of the Uruguay  Round for these countries.
Clearly these results support the paradigm that trade liberalization  leads to significant income
-26-increases, but they also illustrate the crucial importance  of complementary  reforms to fully realize the
potential  gains from the trade reform.  Notably,  with the ability  to access international  capital markets, the
gains are more than doubled.  Moreover,  use of inefficient  replacement  taxes will significantly  reduce  the
gains.  These  combined  results  show  that while  there  are indeed  large  gains  possible  from trade liberalizatioii
complementary  macroeconomic,  regulatory,  and financial  market  reforms  to allow  capitalflows  and  efficient
alternate  tax collection  are crucial  to realize  the large gains.
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-30-Table  1: Input  Assumptions  for Stylized Model
Value Shares  Other Parameters
Intermediate value share (a)  66 %  Baseline Interest Rate  5 %
Import Value Shares  Baseline Growth Rate  2 %
Intermediate Demand (0X)  50 %  Capital Depreciation Rate  7 %
Final Demand (O9 )  20 %  Baseline Tariff Rate  20 %
Domestic intermediate  0 %  Elasticities of Substitution
Imported intermediate  75 %  Intertemporal  0.5
Domestic intermediate capital  50 %  Export Supply  I
Imported intermediate capital  75 %  Import Demand  I
Capital Value Shares
Domestic intermediate  75 %
Imported intermediate  25 %
Blueprint Share of Fixed Cost
Domestic intermediate  90 %
Imported intermediate  10 %Table 2: Benchmark  Social Accounts (steady-state  equilibrium)
L  Y  XD  XM  M  I  FD
PD  0.76  -0.11  -0.25  -0.40
PM  -0.16  0.29  -0.02  -0.10
PX  -0.66  0.33  0.33
PI  0.28  -0.28
PFX  0.24  -0.24
PL  -0.34  _  0.34
RK  -0.11  -0.05  0.16
IMK  I  -0.11  -0.11  0.22
T  I  I  I  -0.05  0.05
Key:
Y  Production of final  PD  Final goods
XD  Domestic  PM  Final goods (imports)
XM  Imported intermediate  PX  Final goods (exports)
M  Imports  PI  Investment
I  Investment  PF  Foreign exchange
FD  Final Demand  PL  Wage rate
RK  Return to capital
M  Markup revenue
T  Tariff revenue
-32-Table 3: Estimated  Welfare  and Growth  Effects of Tariff  Reduction*
Model  EV-  G2010  G2050  Gterm
1. Central Assumptions  10.7  2.6  2.2  2.1
2.  Spillovers  10.9  2.6  2.2  2.1
3. Constant Returns to Scale  0.5  2.0  2.0  2.0
4.  Output Tax Replacement  6.7  2.5  2.1  2.0
5. Capital Income Tax Replacement  4.7  2.4  2.1  2.0
6. Capital Flows  37.0  4.2  2.7  2.2
*  Parameter choices for all models are shown in table 1. Unless otherwise
indicated, all models include: lump sum replacement taxes, no spillover effect of
new foreign varieties on the domestic cost of new blueprints, and period by period
balance of trade constraint..
EVo  Hicksian equivalent variation over the infinite horizon as a percent
the present value of benchmark steady state consumption
G2010  Average consumption growth 1997-2010
G2050  Average consumption growth 1997-2050
Gterm  Terminal growth rate (from 2049 to 2050)
-33-Table 4: Sensitivity  Analysis
Parameter* Central  Sensitivity  Balance  of trade constraint  for each period:
Value  Value  EVoo  G2010  G2050  Gterm
0  10.7  2.6  2.2  2.1
1.  01  0.5  0.25  4.6  2.3  2.1  2.1
2.  a  0.66  0.80  11.0  2.5  2.3  2.2
3.  a  0.66  0.50  11.3  2.8  2.2  2.0
4.  G  0.02  0.03  14.6  3.8  3.3  3.1
5.  R  0.05  0.04  13.0  2.7  2.2  2.1
6.  qtDX  1  2  17.1  3.1  2.3  2.1
7. Tariff  change  20% to 0%  23.7  3.4  2.5  2.2
8. Tariff  change 40% to 30%  9.1  2.6  2.2  2.1
9.Tariff change  40%to0%  51.6  4.4  3.1  2.1
* The counterfactual  scenarios  use the sensitivity  value. The central  value is listed  for reference  only.
Key:
EV°o  Hicksian  equivalent  variation  over the infinite  horizon
G2010  Average  consumption  growth 1997-2010
G2050  Average  consumption  growth 1997-2050
Gterm  Terminal  growth  rate (from 2049  to 2050)
0e  Import  share of intermediate  inputs
a  Intermediate  share of aggregate  cost
G  Baseline  growth  rate
R  Baseline  interest  rate
TlDX  Elasticity  of transformation  in aggregate  production  (domestic  versus  exports)
Tariff  Alternative  pre-existing  tariff rates and tariff reform  programs  (in the reference  case,  20% is cut to 10%)
-34-Table 5: Evaluation of the Uruguay Round Tariff Cuts for Five Developing Countries,
with and without Product Variety Productivity Impacts
Data  Welfare and Growth Estimates
import  post-
Country and Model  intermediate  share of  benchmark  Uruguay
value share  intermediates ltariff  Round tariff  EV°o  G20 10  G2050  Gterm
I Product Variety Productivity
and Capital Flows
A.  Korea  0.6  0.2  15.0  8.0  2.6  2.2  2.1  2.0
B. Malaysia  0.7  0.7  8.0  6.0  4.0  2.3  2.1  2.0
C. Thailand  0.6  0.6  32.0  25.0  7.8  2.5  2.2  2.0
D.  Argentina  0.9  0.1  28.0  23.0  0.7  2.0  2.0  2.0
E.  Brazil  0.6  0.1  30.0  22.0  1.4  2.1  2.0  2.0
II Constant Returns to Scale
and Capital Flows
A.  Korea  0.1  2.0  2.0  2.0
B. Malaysia  0.1  2.0  2.0  2.0
C. Thailand  - same as above - 0.4  2.0  2.0  2.0
D.  Argentina  0.2  2.0  2.0  2.0
E.  Brazil  0.1  2.0  2.0  2.0
Key  : See table 3.
Source  : GTAP dataset for data, see Gehihar et al. (1997); and authors' estimates.
-35-Appendix  A: Growth  and Welfare over  the Infinite  Horizon
This appendix  derives  algebraic  relations  relating  changes  in the growth rate of consumption  to the
equivalent  variation  in infinite-horizon  consumption.  Itthen shows  how  these formula  may be employed  to
provide  consistent  estimates  of infinite  horizon  welfare based  on equilibrium  choices  over a finite horizon.
These  functions  relating  growth  to welfare  are interesting  for two reasons. First,  they providesome  intuition
as to the importance  of changes  in growth rates  vis-a-vis  the more  conventional  static efficiency  estimates
of the welfare  cost of protection. Second,  these equations  are required  for estimating  the infinite-horizon
welfare  change,  given  welfare  changes  over the time horizon  of the model,  the terminal  consumption  level
and the terminal  (steady-state)  consumption  growth  rate.
We begin with a constant-elasticity  of substitution  utility  function:
U(C) =  Alc  jl/p
The  elasticity  of intertemporal  substitution  is given  by c=l/(l  -p).  The  model  is based on ordinal utility,  so
the optimal consumer  choices are unaffected  by monotonic  transformations  of the utility function. For
example,  this utility function  is equivalent  to:
U(C)  =
t=o  1-1/
The advantage  of the former function is that because  it is linearly homogeneous  in consumption  levels
(U(IC)  =  U(C)),  a one  percent change  in U  corresponds  to a one  percent  equivalent  variation  in income.
If we let C denote  a reference  consumption  path, and let C denote an alternative  time  path of consumption
levels,  the equivalent  variation in infinite-horizon  welfare  then  corresponds  to:
-36-EV  =  °  - I
We now  evaluate  the equivalent  variation  of a permanent  change  in the consumption  growth  rate, assuming
that the initial level of  consumption in period t=O is held constant.  Take C,  I( + g )'  and
c,  = ( 1 + g )'.  It then  follows that the equivalent  variation  in income  is:
Er=tI  - a  (I +g)P  I/P_I
EV  =  - A(--)1"  I I  - a  (i  +g)P
In order  to relate  this expression  to the calibrated  equilibrium  calculations  such as those conducted  in our
paper,  it is helpful  to replace  the utility  discount  parameter,  4  by an expression  based  on the baseline  growth
rate and interest  rate. In other words, in order  to compute  a baseline  equilibrium,  we do not begin  with  a
given  value  of the utility  dscountfactor.  We instead  assume  a balanced  baseline  growth  path with agiven
growth rate (g), and a given interest  rate (r).  It is then a simple matter to show that the utility discount
factor is given by:
l+r
Substituting  into the equivalent  variation  equation,  we then have:
_  _  l~~~~/p
r  - (  1
EV=  r-I
+-  ~  +g 
I+9
This expression provides us with a useful check on the magnitude  of welfare gains arising  from our
calculations.  Figure  Al simply  computes  the  Hicksian  welfare  metric  for growth  rate increases  rangingfran
-37-O  to 1%.  Two lines correspond  to baseline  growth rates of 1% and 2%. Both  functions are based on  a
baseline  interest rate of 5% and an intertemporal  elasticity  of substitution  equal to one half  We see that
growth  rate changes  of a 0.5%  produce  welfare  changes  on the  order  of 10  to 15%,  depending  on the initial
growth  rate. Holding  constant  the baseline  interest  rate,  the welfare  change  increases  in thebaseline  growth
rate.
Figure  A2 investigates  the sensitivity  of thisfunction to the baseline  interest  rate. As expected,  the
higher  the  interest  rate, the lower the welfare  gain associated  with a permanent  change in the growth  rate.
A higher interest  rate implies  a larger discount on  future consumption  increases,  so that  future gains in
consumption  are less important.
Figure A3 illustrates  the relationship  between the intertemporal  elasticity  of substitution  and the
welfare  gain associated  with  a hafa  percentage  increase  in the  consumption  growth  rate. Again,  the resuls
are intuitive. The  higher  the elasticiy of intertemporal  substitution,  the larger the achievable  gain  from an
increase  in  future consumption.  When  the intertemporal  elasticity  is close  to zero,  an increase  in the  growth
rate has  not effect  on welfare  because  period 0 consumption  does  not change. However,  as the intertempord
elasticity increase  from zero, the consumer  benefits more as she is able to more easily substitute  current
consumption  for future consumption.
In our  model  calculations,  we adopt afinite-horizon  model  which  approximates  the infinite-horizon
equilibrium. We apply terminal  conditions  which  assure that terminal  period investment  is positive and
increasing with aggregate GDP (See Lau, Palke and Rutherford 1997 for  details on the terminal
approximation.)  Having  computed  equilibrium  values  for period 0 to T, we have  an explicit  utilityindex  over
consumption  in these  periods, but this indexfails to accountfor consumption  increase  in the  post-terminal
period  We can approximate  the infinite  horizon  welfare  index,  however,  based on the  followingfunctions
of thefinite-horizon  model: (i) the welfare  indexfor periods 0 to T, u .,  (ii) terminalperiod  consumption,
-38-C7 and (iii) post-terminal  growth,  g.  We  produce  an infinite-horizon  welfareindex  based  on the assumption
that the economy  exhibits  steady-state  growth  at ratet  from period T+l to the infinite  horizon.
In order to lay out the  formulae  for this approximation,  we begin by splitting the infinite-horizon
welfareintotwoperiods,t=0toTand  t>T  Weassumeagrowthrateofo_=  Tc  Tforthepost-termind
CT
period, then:' 5)
. .I/p~~~~~~~~~~~/ U(C)  =  E  '  cfP
= [  AE  d'  C  P  +  CA'  {  C  (1 +g)()}P  Ij
A  L 'C  p + C P  /  - =  A'  T  I-A(I  +g,f }
When  working with  a calibrated  model, it may be easier to begin  from a reference  balanced  growth  path.
SubstitutingforA  as above,  and denoting  the average  consumption  growth rate through  period t as 0,, the
equivalent  variation  in income  can be written:
EV(f=  ){  [4  -_±~
I l  +r)  I  =°  t=O  +r  +g
+  T  1  g(  r  ) 1T1  I  +g  p-  - I  1/
I+r  JI  I +r  +g
Alternatively,  this expression  can be written  in terms  of the wefare  level through  period T and the level and
In the finite horizon  model  we use a utility function,
UT  =  (  S  /vt CP)
in which  there is no additional  'weight' on period T consumption.  In the finite  horizon  model, a constraint  on the
terminal  capital  stock such that investment  follows  a steady-state  growth  path. Having  computed  the finite  horizon
equilibrium,  we then compute  the infinite  horizon  welfare  index.
-39-growth  rate of consumption  in the  post-terminalperiod,  i.e.
EV {  3  Up + (Ir-)  I,  }
In which  we define:  . = -b,  where  0  =  - and.
y (gX g)  =  1
1+i V
In a constant  growth rate model, the term y (g., g) is always  unity, so the welfare  then depends  solely  on
the utility  index through  model horizon  and the terminal  consumption  level  relative to the original  steady-
state  growth rate.
-40-Appendix  B: Benchmark  Assumptions  and Calibration
Consider  the input  data as outlined  in Table 1. Scaling  base  yearfinal  goods  output  to unity,  we then
define  imported  and domestic  intermediate  inputs  as:
x,W=o a  and  xD=(I  -1)  a'
Labor  inputs for final goods  production  may then be inferred  through  exhaustion  of product:
LM  = ei  (I-a)  and  L.  = (1-01)  (I-a).
Base year wage income is the sum of these values,  L =LD  +LM.
The interrnediate  value  share  determines  markups  over marginal  cost,  and this in turn defines  markip
revenues  given assumed  sales by firm type:
mkf  = xf (1 -a),  f  e  {D,M}
Capital  returns in intermediate  goods  production  are defined  as a fraction  of variable  cost:
vkf = kvsf (xf  - mk)
Imported  inputs to intermediate  goods  production  are also defined  as a fraction  of variable  cost:
mxf  = mvsf  (xf  - m9k)
Domestic  inputs to intermediate  production  are determined  by exhaustion  of product:
dxf  = (I-kvs,-mvs)  (x,-mkp
The user cost of capital equals  interest  plus depreciation,  so the initial capital  stock in can then be inferred
from capital returns:
-41-vk
kx  =  f
f  r+8
Fixed  costs of intermediate  goods  production  equal  the sum  of recurring  fixed  costs and blueprints. We use
a parameter  fcshrf to define how  these shares are separated:
fcOf  = fcshr1 mkr
Blueprints  do not depreciate,  so the value  of a firm's  equity is related  to the base year dividends  through  the
interest  rate:
(1-fcshrf)  mkf
ff  - r
Base  year furm  creation  is determined  by the steady-state  growth  ram  (there is no depreciation  of blue-prints
in this model):
if = g f
Domestic  and intermediate  inputs to investment  are based on the import  value share in investment:
imjf  =  mvsIf if  idf = (I-mvsi)  if .
Base year  capital investment  in firms is sufficient  to cover growth  plus depreciation  of the capital stock:
ixf  = kxf (g  + o)  .
Net investment  by households  in the intermediate  goods  sector  equals  the total vahe of blueprint  and capital
formation,  less  the value of markup  revenue  net of recurring  fixed costs:
I  = F_f  if  + ixf  - (mkf  + mkf  - fc?
As we assume  that tariff revenues  are returned  to the consumer  in a lump  sum,  me  must determine  base year
tariff revenue and imports to final demand simultaneously.  The following system of equations  then
determine  base year  tariff revenue  (7) and imports  (c):
-42-T  = I  +t  ( C. + Efmxf im)
and
C.  = 0c (L  - I  + 7)
Solving, we have
T=t  (  (L-1)  + ;,mx,+im,)
1  +t (1 -0)
Domestic consumption is then
Cd  = (1-0c)  (L-I+T)
Total demand for domestic output is equal to the sum of final demand, inputs to intermediate production,
recurring fixed costs for intermediate demand, inputs to new firms and investment in capital
goods for new firms:
D  =  cd  +  Er  dxf + fcf  + idf + ixf
We assume that both firm types supply to the domestic and import markets in the same proportions, we
therefore use market share to define production to the domestic and export market by firm type.
dD  = (1-OX) D,  dM  =Ox  D
Imports include those for final consumption, X production and X-sector investment:
M  = cm +  E,  mx,f - im,
I +t
The value of total exports equals the net of tariff value of imports. Imposing trade balance, the value of
exports equals the value of imports deflated by the base year tariff:  And then from our assumption of
symmetry of export shares across domestic and foreign firms, we have:
e  =  M,  eD  = ( 1-  ) M
-43-Figure 1: Consumption  Path following  Tariff Reform
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